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Investigating the Impact of
Widening Price Limits on Volatility:
The Experience of the Nigerian
Stock Exchange

1 Introduction

E

ven though the efficacy of price limits
in moderating stock return volatility is
in doubt , many countries continue to
employ them. Regulators argue that if
markets are small, illiquid and prone to
market manipulation, then price limits can
mitigate overreaction by unsophisticated
retail investors. However, the Chinese
debacle of early 2016, where price limits
were hurriedly instituted to counter choppy
trading and then swiftly dismantled, calls into
question that argument .
This paper uses a unique market and a
robust methodology to answer the question:
What happens to stock return volatility in
small, illiquid markets that lack extensive
price discovery mechanisms when price
limits are removed or expanded?
It is not clear if removing or widening price
limits will always moderate volatility. In well
developed markets, price limits may not
reduce volatility. Rather, price limits may
slow down the process of price discovery,
disperse volatility to other trading days and
reduce liquidity (Surahmanyam, 1994). On
the other hand, Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty
(2010) argue that price limits may be
beneficial in markets susceptible to price
manipulation. The lack of consensus on the
impact of price limits on stock volatility calls
for a more in-depth examination.
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Abstract
This paper empirically evaluates the impact
of return volatility from widening price limits
from 5% to 10% on the Nigerian Stock
Exchange(NSE) on September 18, 2012
using a Stochastic Volatility model in an
event study framework. Using daily trading
data from September 2010 to September
2014, the study finds that widening of price
limits in the NSE has not increased volatility
as feared by some regulators. Stocks with
higher free floats and institutional ownership
display lower volatility when price limits are
widened. This suggests that smaller stock
exchanges can improve market efficiency by
widening price limits without increasing
volatility. The findings also suggest the
benefits of widening price limits in improving
the price discovery process outweighs any
costs associated with irrational behavior by
market participants.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to
bridge the gap in the existing literature by
using a more robust methodology to
empirically assess whether loosening price
limits in a small, speculative and illiquid
market will increase stock market volatility.
This study uses a stochastic volatility (SV)
model in an event study framework to
examine whether the policy that widened
price limits from (+/-) 5 to (+/-) 10 on 18th
September 2012, on the Nigerian Stock
Exchange (NSE) has increased stock return
volatility. The study also investigates
whether widening price limits improves
market efficiency by reducing the serial
correlations in stock returns.

Keywords: Price Limits, Stochastic
Volatility, Market Efficiency and Emerging
Markets
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The main contribution of this paper is to
show that even for markets that lack
sophisticated investors, widening price limits
does not increase conditional volatility.
Instead, expanding or removing price limits
may increase the efficiency of the market by
improving the process of price discovery and
liquidity. This study also extends the price
limit literature by using a SV method for
estimating conditional volatility in a very thin
market. Previous studies looking at the
impact of price limits on stock return volatility
use the autoregressive GARCH
methodology. However, using GARCH
methodology to examine financial series is
subject to bias due to fat tails, leverage
effects, and unobserved values (Alberg et
al., 2008). SV methods provide more robust
estimates in dealing with volatility in financial
series (Nakajima, 2008).

volatility and volume to increase on the
subsequent trading day. In that case, price
limits simply disrupt the normal and efficient
transmission of information used to
determine the price of the stock. This is the
foundation of the information hypothesis.
The fundamental assumption of the
information hypothesis is that investors are
rational and also that prices are governed by
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). If
price limits are truncating the flow of
information, then pre-limit and post-limit
price behavior will be predictable (Lehmann,
1989). This predictability violates the EMH
and makes price limits costly and inefficient.
Regulators in developing countries where
these price limits are mostly found view the
function and consequences of price limits
differently. Typically, these markets are
dominated by unsophisticated retail
investors and suffer from poor liquidity, herd
mentality, and high volatility resulting from
markets overreacting to information
(Greenwald & Stein, 1988). It is assumed
that investors in such markets are prone to
overreacting to both positive and negative
information shocks. The assumption that
market participants are inclined to
overreacting is termed the overreaction
hypothesis. The overreaction hypothesis
suggests markets are characterized by
erratic and panic tendencies that are not
consistent with market fundamentals.

From a theoretical point of view, placing
limits on the movement of prices for an asset
will prevent an equilibrium price from being
established on that trading day. When
obstacles to the free movement of prices are
instituted, costly inefficiencies may be
introduced into the market. That is, investors
who wish to purchase (or sell) a security at a
price beyond the arbitrarily set limits may be
unable to complete their trades on that
trading day. Consider this example. An
investor wishes to bid for Microsoft shares
up to a price, say $(p+5) but the daily price
limit does not allow trades at prices beyond
$p. Since the investor values Microsoft at a
price outside the price limit range, the
closing market price of $p does not
constitute a true clearing price of that stock
for the day. Unless the investor's demand
changes, the price of the stock on the
second day will move in the direction of the
previous trading day to accommodate the
investor's valuation of the stock.
Lee et al. (1994) argue that the prevention of
trading caused by regulatory devices causes

In such markets, price limits can temper the
actions of participants by restricting prices to
a limit on that trading day. The limit will
provide a cooling off period through which
traders can reassess information and make
more informed decisions in the subsequent
trading period. If traders were overreacting
to information, then price limits will break that
trend and, therefore, reduce volatility. The
overreaction hypothesis can be tested by
looking at the conditional volatility of assets
before and after price limits are put in place.
If volatility declines after price limits are
instituted, then the overreaction hypothesis
cannot be rejected thus lending credence to
the argument of regulators- that price limits
moderate volatility.

1See

Zhang et al (2016) for a survey of recent literature on this subject
regulators placed price limits that were supposed to
suspend or halt altogether trading on a particular trading day
if prices were to fall outside a certain range. On 4th January 2016,
the first day of trading, the composite index declined enough to
activate the circuit breaker. The circuit breaker was again
activated on the 7th of January when the CSI 300 index fell by
7% in the first 29 minutes trading.

2 Chinese
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Examining overreaction in the behavior of
market participants would be futile if limited
to larger markets. This is because most of
these markets are at-least semi-strong
efficient. However, the same cannot be said
of participants and price in weaker markets.
Predictable behavior in stock returns in
emerging markets is due to market
inefficiency and overreaction (Boubaker et
al., 2015) and speculative trading (Bekaert
and Harvey, 1997). Figure 1 shows some
divergence in return characteristics between
well developed markets in the United States
(DOW) versus less developed markets in
China (SSE) and Nigeria (NSE). While the
DOW is relatively stable with returns
oscillating between a +/- 3% ranges, both
the NSE and the SSE show frequent
deviation from the mean.

SSE and NSE that are inefficient. This is
especially important in markets with weak
corporate governance structures and poor
or non-existent market monitoring
mechanisms. The NSE is a good example of
such markets.
The Nigerian Stock Exchange
Established in 1960, the Nigerian Stock
Exchange is, as of 2015, the third largest
stock exchange on the African continent. As
of the 18th of September 2012, the NSE had
201 stocks listed on the main board, with the
30 largest stocks accounting for almost 85%
of its capitalization. Market capitalization is
around $90 billion. Average daily trading
volume is approximately $30 million, which
translates to turnover ratio of 0.033%.
Foreign investors (mostly institutional
investors) account for about 55% of all
transactions from 2010 to 2015 (NSE Annual
report 2015). The average capitalization of
firms in the exchanges is about $203 million
with the average firm having about 85
percent of its shares free floating.

Table 1 shows the summary statistics of
returns on the NSE, SSE and the DOW.
There are key distinctions on the measures
that indicate non-normality in returns,
particularly the standard deviation of the
returns, the coefficient of variation, and
excess kurtosis. These differences in
characteristics partly explain why the
evidence on the efficacy of price limits is
mixed. In addition, the macro-economic,
political and social environment in
developed countries is different from those
in emerging countries. The peculiar
characteristics of emerging markets
necessitate a separate analysis to
determine the impact of price limits on
volatility.

From the inception of the exchange in 1960
to 2008, asymmetric price limits of (+/-) 5 of
the previous closing price were maintained
to moderate volatility. The exchange
temporarily changed the price limit to (+ 5)
and ( -1) in 2008 due to the global financial
crises. The price limits reverted to a
symmetric (+/-) 5 late 2008 until September
18th 2012, when the price limits were
widened to (+/-) 10 on a selected group of 16
stocks.

It is imperative, therefore, to examine the
impact of price limits in markets such as the

Figure 1: Return Characteristics of NSE, SSE and the DOW Indexes
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Some relevant market characteristics about
the 16 stocks included in the wider price limit
(WPL) group is provided in Table 2. For the
stocks included in the WPL regime: median
capitalization is $244.4 million; free float
75%, dividend yield 4.6%; and 0.030%
turnover ratio. The stocks included in the
WPL regime have slightly above average
capitalization and liquidity. No explicit
reason was given for why the 16 stocks are
chosen. But it appears that the chosen
stocks have a longer history of unbroken
dividend payments, better corporate
governance structures, and larger
capitalization.

exchange. They find mixed results that show
circuit breakers may moderate volatility in
the short run causing some price reversal
after limits hits. Most of the price reversal
and overreaction is limited to stocks with
larger capitalizations and lower leverage.
However, they also conclude that the long
run effectiveness of price limits cannot be
established.
Lu (2016) also finds capitalization and
trading volume play an important role in
assessing the impact of price limits on
volatility. This suggests a dichotomy
between thinly traded stocks, which tend to
display return predictability, versus large cap
stocks. Huang et al. (2001) explicitly
examined both the information and
overreaction hypothesis in the Taiwan stock
exchange between 1991-1996. Due to the
nature of the market, they find price
continuations in overnight trading and then
price reversals for subsequent trading
periods. This is an indication in support of
both the information and overreaction
hypothesis. Huang et al. (2001) argue that
price continuation is caused by noise traders
who cannot discern the actual value of the
stock overnight- a period in which trading is
not allowed to occur. This price continuation
behavior is manifested by the opening price
in the subsequent trading period moving in
the same direction as the closing price.
However, as information traders incorporate
their private valuation of the security, all the
volatility generated by noise traders is
reversed. This, they argue, shows a certain
level of erratic behavior in the market, which
is consistent with the overreaction
hypothesis.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 surveys the literature on this topic.
Section 3 explores the data and empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents the results,
discussion and robustness checks. Section
5 concludes.
2.0 Literature Review
Proponents of price limits believe that, in
situations where panic behavior and
overreaction is present, price limits dampen
overreaction and thus cause volatility to
decline. Looking at the performance of price
limits on Treasury bond futures in the highly
volatile period of the early 1980's, Ma, Rao &
Sears (1989) conclude that the presence of
price limits causes volatility to decline on
subsequent trading days if limits are reached
on a particular day. They anchor this belief
on the power of price limits in counteracting
'noise' in trading during highly volatile
periods. Lehmann (1989) disputes the
conclusions from Ma, Rao and Sears on the
grounds that without an accurate accounting
for the type of traders (patient traders or
noise traders), it is difficult to ascertain
whether over reactive elements dominate
the market. Indeed, he argues that price
limits can cause volatility to increase if
patient traders cut their supply of the security
as the stock reaches its limit. Lauterbach &
Ben Zion (1993) present a more detailed
look into the performance of price limits and
other circuit breakers during the October
1987 market crash in the Tel-Aviv stock

Kim, Liu and Yang (2013) present evidence
that shows price limits facilitating the
process of price discovery, moderating
volatility and mitigating abnormal trading
activity. This result stands in direct contrast
to Kim and Rhee (1997) who argue that price
limits disrupt the price discovery process,
which leads to volatility spilling over to
subsequent periods. While Kim, Liu and
Yang (2013) show the merits of price limits,
they did not state the mechanism through
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which price limits moderate volatility or
mitigate abnormal trading activity. One
potential explanation for the conclusions in
Kim, Liu and Yang (2013) may be found in
Kim and Park (2010). According to Kim and
Park (2010) price limits are an indirect way of
minimizing the disruptive action of market
manipulators. For markets where price
manipulators are prevalent or the fear of
price manipulation is real, price limits may be
beneficial. Under these conditions, they
argue, price limits increases the cost of
manipulation and also increase the
likelihood of being exposed.

from the anchored level (which are forced
through price limits), price movements are
reduced, in turn lowers volatility.
The results of testing the overreaction
hypothesis in actual markets such as the
artificial one modeled in Yeh and Yang
(2010) have been consistently against
evidence of overreaction. For instance,
Phylaktis, Kavussanos & Manalis (1999) in
the
Athens stock exchange; Bildik &
Elekdag (2004) in the Istanbul Stock
Exchange; Zhang et al. (2016) in the
Shanghai Stock Exchange; Henke
&Voronkova (2005) in the Warsaw Stock
Exchange; Polwitoon (2011) in the Thai
Stock Exchange; and Farag (2013) in the
Egyptian Stock Exchange all reject the
overreaction hypothesis.

Perhaps the main issue ignored in assessing
the merits of price limits is the market
structure. As noted previously, markets
governed by the EMH as less sensitive to
predictable behavior. Many emerging
markets have been shown to exhibit some of
tendencies that violate EMH (Aggarawal et
al., 1999). To account for these factors,
Westerhoff (2003) constructed an artificial
market with these peculiar characteristics to
examine the efficacy of price limits. The
artificial market is designed to have bubbles,
excess volatility and fat tails for returns.
Westerhoff (2003) finds that under these
conditions, price limits may reduce volatility.
The result suggests that markets with these
peculiar characteristics are prone to
overreaction and that price limits function as
regulators intended in mitigating volatility.
Yeh and Yang (2010) improve Westerhoff
(2003) by constructing a market with rational
and heterogeneous traders to examine the
effectiveness of price limits.

The discourse above demonstrates the lack
of consensus on the actual impact of the
adoption of wider price limits on the market.
More recent empirical studies support this.
For instance, Lin and Chiao (2019) shows a
tradeoff between improvements in liquidity
and inefficiencies in the price discovery
process when price limits are widened. This
suggests markets are irrational but as Wang,
Ding, and Hsin (2018) shows, price limits are
effective in mitigating irrational behavior in
stock markets. Both studies were conducted
within similar time frames on the Taiwan
Stock Exchange; but the results would seem
contradictory with one showing partial
evidence on market inefficiencies
introduced by price limits while the other
suggests price limits help in countering
inefficiencies (and irrational behaviors) on
the exchange.

The artificial market in Yeh and Yang (2010)
is designed in such a way that traders have a
dynamic learning behavior to mimic the
stylized facts observed in real financial
markets. They find mixed evidence on the
effectiveness of price limits in moderating
volatility. They argue that since traders are
characterized by bounded rationality, the
traders do not know the fundamental value
of an asset. The information used to assign
value to the asset is constantly updated by
the traders relative to an anchored level.
Because prices do not deviate sufficiently

At the same time, Seddighi and Yoon (2018)
finds recent expansion on price limits
increases market efficiencies which is at
direct variance with Lim and Brooks (2009)
who argue that narrow price limits do not
introduce market inefficiencies.
This study utilizes an event study framework
with SV specification to compare the
conditional volatility of stock returns before
and after price limits are widened on the
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Nigerian Stock Exchange. The use of SV as
a device of estimating conditional volatility
allows for a robust estimation of volatility in
the presence of censored prices and other
market inefficiencies. Additionally, previous
studies conducted on this topic had been
concentrated on markets that have large
trading volumes and large market caps. It is
then expected that examining this subject
under a small and illiquid market such as
NSE can provide a better insight on the
impact of price limits in markets where
market manipulations are rampant and
irrational behavior is frequently observed.

markets exhibit skewness and kurtosis that
are changing over time (Bekaert et al.,
1998). As such, volatility models that use
autoregressive methods are likely to provide
biased estimates. Wilhelmsson (2006)
shows forecasting with GARCH methods
provide significantly different point estimates
based on distributional assumption
employed. On the other hand, Watanabe
and Asai (2001) argue that SV model are
less sensitive to distributional assumptions.
Unlike SV models, the leptokurtosis of
returns increases GARCH variance
estimates due to current volatility
determined only by previous volatility.

2.1 Why Use Stochastic Volatility?
Based on the two factors above, I expect
using SV to model time varying volatility to
provide more robust estimates. This is
mainly due to SV models incorporating two
error processes in the return equation and
the conditional volatility equation that
provide more flexibility in fitting the data
(Hafner and Preminger, 2010).

As noted previously, using GARCH
methodology to examine financial series is
subject to bias due to censored observations
and distributional assumptions. I explain
below the reasons for using a SV model to
provide more robust estimates in assessing
the impact of price limits on conditional
volatility.

3.0 Methodology
3.1 Data of Constituent Stocks

Censored observations: Are limit-hitting
closing prices in a market with price limits the
equilibrium prices for that trading day? The
answer is: (i) Yes, if prices would have
settled at the price limit even if there were no
price limits in place; (ii) No, if price limits
prevented the closing prices from reaching a
point which is beyond the limit ranges. In
markets with price limits, it is difficult to
establish whether condition (i) or (ii) causes
closing prices to settle at the price limit.
Some studies have modeled this uncertainty
in examining the efficacy of price limits (See
Kodres, 1988 for example). While these
adjustments improve the estimation of
conditional volatility, they do not completely
remove the bias. Wei (2002) shows that
using a censored-GARCH model provides a
more robust estimation of volatility
associated with the imposition of price limits.
However, even censored-GARCH models
do not completely eliminate the bias inherent
in AR models.

I source daily trading data primarily from
http://www.cashcraft.com/pmovement.php.
Market data for individual stocks was
extracted fromhttp://markets.ft.
com/research.This study uses daily trading
data from September 2010 to September
2014 for a total of 1,010 trading days. This
time frame covers 2 years prior to the policy
widening price limits and 2 years after.
I present the stock return summary statistics
in Table 3. The mean return is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. I check for
autocorrelation using Box-Pierce Test with a
lag order of 2. From column 5 of Table 3, I
reject the null that returns are unpredictable
for nine out of the sixteen stocks under
examination. The existence of serial
correlation in daily return is not in of itself
conclusive evidence of a violation of the
EMH. The fact that the majority of stocks in
this analysis exhibit this behavior provides
more justification for using the NSE to
examine the impact of price limits. The
Jarque-Bera statistics show that the null of

Fat tails: It is well-established that stock
returns (and return volatility) in emerging
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normality is rejected for all stocks.
3.2 Models Specification

where
is the return for the
stock between two trading days; is a
normally distributed error in the return
equation; is the conditional volatility at time
t; is the mean of log volatility, is the
persistence in volatility, and is the volatility
of log volatility. is the error in the variance
equation. I modify the conditional volatility
Equation (3) by adding a binary dummy
variable (WPL). WPL takes the value 0 prior
to the 18th of September 2012 and 1
afterwards.
(5)

To determine whether widening price limits
in the NSE increases stock return volatility, I
empirically test the Information and
Overreaction Hypotheses. The identifying
assumption in testing the information
hypothesis is: I expect to see more serial
correlation in stock return due to the
regulation widening price limits. I formulate a
hypothesis similar to Phylaktis, Kavussanos
& Manalis (1999): There are significant serial
correlations in returns in the narrower pricelimit period. I test this hypothesis using the
following econometric specification:
(1)
wherey_t=ln(p_t/p_(t-1)) is the stock return
between two trading days, t is the time in
days, while ?_t is the error term. The lag order
is captured by i. If price limits restrict prices
from hitting their equilibrium on a limit-hitting
day, then it should be the case that prices will
continue moving in the same direction in the
subsequent trading periods until the
equilibrium is reached. Accordingly, this
hypothesis examines whether the narrow
price limits prevailing prior to the policy
change cause a predictable movement in
prices in the day after the limit is hit. In
essence, if more
are significantly
different from zero in the narrow price limit
period, this indicates that price limits are
truncating the flow of information into prices.
The second question I investigate is whether
stock return volatility increases when the
price limit is widened. I test the following
hypothesis: Stock return volatility of returns
in the wider price-limit period should be
greater than in the narrow-limit period. I test
this hypothesis by employing a time-varying
volatility model along the lines of Kim,
Shepard & Chib's (1998) as follows:
(2)
(3)
(4)
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The parameter of interest is
It measures
whether stock return volatility changes after
price limits are widened on the NSE. A
significantly positive coefficient on WPL
means a wider price limit causes conditional
volatility to increase when price limits are
widened. A negative ? suggests conditional
volatility decreases when price limits are
widened.
Table 4 presents some raw data on the
number of limit hits before and after price
limits are widened. As expected, there are
more limit hits during the narrow price limit
regime.
On average, stocks hit the 5% limit about 11
times during the narrow price limit period.
Upper hits are more common than lower hits
that may indicate an asymmetry in how
market participants react to positive and
negative news. When price limits are
widened, the average number of limit hits
falls to around 2 times over the time frame.
Based on the Information hypothesis, limit
hits are indicative of a truncation of the price
discovery process. In that regard, the data
from Table 4 suggests that narrower price
limits do restrict the free movement of prices.
Figure 2 presents a time series plot of stock
returns. The vertical line at the middle of the
figures represents the period when price
limits were widened. The figure shows less
variability and more clustering in stock
returns during the narrow price limit period.
This suggests a level of predictability in the
movement of prices, which is in violation of
the EMH. After price limits are expanded, the
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figure shows more variation in returns and
less clustering. The increasing randomness
in returns after price limits are widened
provides a visual confirmation of markets
becoming more efficient.

the results disaggregating the analysis for
each stock separately. This may show if the
estimates from a few stocks are driving the
results.
DIAMOND: From Table 5, the coefficient on
the first-order lag shows that there is no
serial correlation in the NPL regime. The
result also rules out the existence of firstorder serial correlation in the WPL. However,
the second-order lag presents a different
story. The coefficient,
under NPL is
insignificant while
is negative and
significant for WPL. These estimates
provide a mixed picture. Instead of
establishing the information

4.0 Results and Discussion
Prior to commencing the analysis, I check
the stationarity of the series to ensure
boundedness. Unit root tests using ADF and
KPSS models show the series are stationary
(results not shown). I present the results of
testing the information hypothesis as
specified in Equation (1) in Table 5. I limit the
analysis to two lags because serial
correlation on lags greater than two days
were mostly insignificant. which measures
first-order serial correlation in returns under
the narrow price limit (NPL) regime is
statistically significant in six out of fourteen
stocks. Upon widening price limits, only two
out of 14 stocks show first-order serial
correlation.
More price continuations over 2 consecutive
trading days, t and t+1, in the NPL regime
provides some evidence in support of the
information hypothesis.
Evidence of first-order autocorrelation in
stock returns is necessary but not sufficient
to make definitive statements about the
information hypothesis. To obtain more
robust evidence, I check whether prices
continue along the same trend 2 days apart.
That is, will the direction of the second-order
lag, also be consistent with first-order lag?
Under narrow price limits, the coefficient on
the second order lag,
for four out of
fourteen stocks is negative and statistically
significant. The coefficient
during the
wider price limit is negative and statistically
significant in three out of the 14 stocks.
A Price continuation between t and t+1 is
consistent with the information hypothesis
but price reversals between t + 1 and t + 2
suggests overreaction. The estimates seem
to be in conflict with some evidence in
support of the information hypothesis and
other pieces of information in support of the
overreaction hypothesis. I attempt to clarify

Figure 2: Times Series Plot of the Stocks
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hypothesis, this result points to some level
of market correction which is inconsistent
with the EMH.
FCMB: The coefficient
for this stock is
positive and statistically significant under
NPL but insignificant under the WPL. This
indicates that under NPL, the stock is
exhibiting serial autocorrelation. Upon
widening the price limits, serial correlation in
stock returns in not present. The coefficients
on the second order lag are insignificant.
These results suggest that when price limits
are narrow, the stock exhibits price
continuation which is consistent with the
information hypothesis.

reversals- a sign of market inefficiency- in
the NPL which does not carry over when
price limits are widened. This is consistent
with the information hypothesis, which posits
that non-linearities are more likely to occur
during NPL.
INTERBREW: The estimate on for this
stock is positive and significant under NPL
but insignificant under WPL. The results on
are both insignificant. These results
suggest the stock exhibited serial
autocorrelation in the NPL but not in the
WPL, which is consistent with information
hypothesis.

FIDELITY: The coefficient on is significant
at the 90% under the NPL but insignificant
under WPL. The coefficient on second-order
serial correlation is insignificant for both NPL
and WPL. This result is consistent the
information hypothesis and the raw data in
Table 4 which shows the number of limit hits
falling from 12 under NPL to zero when price
limits were expanded.

NB: Table 5 shows the estimate on for this
stock is positive and significant during the
NPL but insignificant in the WPL regime.
Additionally,
is negative and significant
under NPL but not in the WPL. This result
indicates both price continuation at t + 1 and
price reversals at t + 2. The price reversal at
t + 2 suggests the price continuation in t + 1 is
cancelled out thus negating the conclusion
on the significance of . The existence of
return predictability during NPL and not in
WPL points to the disruptive feature of price
limits.

FIDSON: The estimate on for this stock
shows there is no serial autocorrelation
under both NPL or WPL. However, the
coefficient on the second-order serial
correlation is negative and statistically
significant under NPL. The estimate on is
insignificant under WPL. Price reversals,
even under NPL, do not provide evidence in
support of the information hypothesis. The
lack of such price reversals under WPL may
indicate an improvement in market
efficiency.

PRESCO, PZ and WAPCO: For these three
stocks, I do not estimate a statistically
significant coefficient for serial
autocorrelation in either NPL or the WPL.
REDSTAR: Table 5 shows the estimate of
and
are negative and statistically
significant under the WPL period.
The coefficients on first-order and secondorder serial correlations are insignificant
under the NPL. This is interesting on 2
counts. First, it suggests that there is no
serial autocorrelation under the more
restrictive NPL period. This is contrary to my
expectations of more predictability in a
narrow price limit period as seen in other
stocks. Secondly, the negative signs on both
and
suggests price reversals on both
days t+1 and +2 . This implies that when
price limits were widened, stock returns may
be inflated at t which necessitates a reversal
on days t+1 and t+2. This is not consistent

GTB: Table 5 shows the estimate on
for
this stock is insignificant in the NPL but
negative and significant under the WPL. This
is a curious result in that no price
continuations are observed under NPL but
price reversals are prevalent under WPL. It
is hard to reconcile this result with the
assumption that NPL reduce market
efficiency. This result suggest the reverse.
For
the estimate is negative and
statistically significant under NPL but
insignificant under WPL. This result is more
consistent with expectation. It shows price
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with the information hypothesis which
assumes more inefficiencies in the NPL.

more stocks exhibiting serial correlation in
the NPL which is consistent with the
information hypothesis.
Turning to the overreaction hypothesis, the
3
RSTAN bayesian package to estimate
conditional volatility was utilized. I initialize
the prior distributions of the hyperparameters following Hsieh & Yang (2009)
as follows. The model was estimated using
10,000 iterations, 1 chain, 2,000 burn-in
iterations, and the last 1,000 draws in the
chain for analysis.

STERLING and UACN: The estimate on
first-order serial correlation under NPL is
positive and statistically significant for both
stocks. When price limits were widened, is
positive but insignificant. All estimates on the
second-order lag are also insignificant.
These results provide strong support for the
information hypothesis.
ZENITH: Table 5 shows there is no firstorder serial correlation in stock returns under
both NPL and WPL. The estimate of
however, is negative and statistically
significant under both the NPL and the WPL.
Stock return predictability between days t
and t+2, does not provide strong evidence to
reject the information hypothesis.

Table 6 presents the results of testing the
overreaction hypothesis. The posterior
means of the parameters and standard
deviation are reported for: the mean of log
volatility,
the persistence in volatility,
and the volatility of log volatility

In summary, Table 5 shows that evidence
supporting the information hypothesis is
mixed. For the most part, stocks exhibited
return predictability during the narrow price
limit period. This is consistent with the
information-censoring story. However,
frequent price reversals suggest markets
may be overreacting in exhibiting price
continuations. A few other things also come
to light. The stocks that exhibit first-order
serial correlation in stock returns tend to be
illiquid.
Chordia, Richard, and
Subrahmanyan (2008) shows that as a
result of more private information being
incorporated into stock prices return
autocorrelations decrease when liquidity
improves. The results in Table 5 also confirm
the link between liquidity and market
efficiency. It indicates that more liquid stocks
are not the ones displaying first-order
correlations. I argue that when limits were
widened, liquidity improved which lead to
fewer stocks exhibiting first-order
autocorrelations.

The mean of parameter of interest,
is
presented in column 7 with the 95%
credibility interval reported in the square
brackets beneath the mean , in column (7).
The study finds widening price limits did not
alter the conditional volatility of 10 stocks out of
the fourteen stocks examined. The coefficient
that measures whether volatility increased when
the price limit was widened,
is negative, but
statistically insignificant, for half the stocks. For
FCMB, is negative and significant which
implies that price limits caused the conditional
volatility for FCMB to decline. For NB,
PRESCO and PZ, conditional volatility
increased when price limits were widened. But
why does volatility increase when price limits are
widened for NB, PRESCO and PZ , but not the
other stocks?
Free Float and Liquidity: From Table 2, the
stocks with the least ratio of shares floating are
PZ, NB and PRESCO. These also happen to be
the stocks that exhibit higher conditional
volatility when price limits were widened.
FCMB, with 98% of its shares free floating,
witnessed a decline in conditional stock volatility

Ultimately, my hypothesis is that there is
more serial correlation in returns during the
narrow price limit regime. The results show
3
Stan Development Team (2015). Stan:
A C++ Library for Probability and Sampling,
Version 2.8.0. URL http://mc-stan.org
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during the WPL regime. While not directly
linear, it appears that there is a relationship
between free float and volatility (Hong,
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2006). Floating
affects volatility through the flow of
information in the valuation of the stock.
Since investors have heterogeneous beliefs
about the intrinsic value of the stock, the
availability of free floating stocks allow both
investors with an optimistic and pessimistic
valuation of the stock to trade. In the limit
with a large shareholding base, the
expectations of optimistic and pessimistic
investors cancel each other, which
moderates the volatility in prices. This
constant tug between buyers and sellers
with different expectations increases the
liquidity of the stock. In fact, the medium
through which stocks with higher free floats
exhibit lower volatility is liquidity. It is not
surprising therefore that the stocks
exhibiting higher conditional volatility when
price limits were widened are the least liquid.
Illiquidity hampers market efficiency, which
in-turn causes the conditional volatility to
increase.

I present the plots of the conditional volatility
over time in Figure 3. These give additional
insight into the evolution of volatility before
and after widening price limits. The
horizontal volatility. Additionally, the figure
shows large, but infrequent, spikes in
conditional volatility after price limits are
widened for NB, PRESCO and PZ. This
seems to suggest that volatility increased for
NB, PZ and PRESCO in the WPL due to few
periods of extreme volatility and not as a
result of sustained overreaction. There
seems to be less clustering in the conditional
volatility plots for all types of stocks after
price limits are expanded. As a whole, these
results are consistent with previous studies
conducted on small markets that reject the
overreaction hypothesis (See Bildik &
Elekdag, 2004; Polwitoon, 2011; and Farag,
2013). This result enriches the literature by
showing evidence against the overreaction
hypothesis in a very small illiquid market
characterized by many smallunsophisticated retail investors. It also
shows even in the absence of tools which aid
the process of price discovery (derivatives
and market makers), widening price limits on
the NSE does not increase volatility.

Foreign Ownership: Table 2 also provides an
additional clue on why conditional volatility
increased during the WPL for NB, PRESCO
and PZ. With the exception of WAPCO, all
the stocks with foreign ownership greater
than 50% witnessed an increase in volatility
during the WPL. Foreign investors raise the
volatility of stocks by importing world market
risk (Bae et al., 2004). Even a relatively small
number of foreign investors can have a
disproportionate impact on volatility (Wang,
2007). The nature of foreign ownership in the
NSE is not in the form of foreign institutional
investors. Rather, stocks with large foreign
ownership tend to be subsidiaries of foreign
companies in Nigeria. It is noteworthy in this
context that foreign participation in the NSE
has increased by 72% from 2006 to 2011
(NSE Annual report, 2011).

While the results from this section largely
reject the overreaction hypothesis, the
results from the 3 stocks showing higher
volatility warrants further examination. The
study employs a different specification to
confirm the consistency of the results. Using
GARCH methods, Ohuche and Ikoku (2014)
find the introduction of higher symmetric
price band moderated volatility on the NSE
while Olowookere (2014) shows volatility
increasing when price limits are widened on
the (NSE).
The study finds that widening price limits
does not worsen stock return volatility as
feared by regulators. Using the SV
framework, no change was observed in the
conditional volatility for nine out of 14 stocks I
examine when price limits were widened.

4
For instance, NB is the Nigerian subsidiary of the
Dutch brewing giant Heineken BV and Distilled Trading BV.
The parent company holds close to 67% of the stock.
PZ is a subsidiary of PZ Cussons of the UK who
hold 69.22% of the shares. PRESCO is a company focused on
growing, processing, and marketing Palm oil. The SIAT group of Belgium
is the parent company of PRESCO and holds 60% of the equity with
the other 40% held by other domestic investors. In these three companies
and others that subsidiaries of foreign conglomerates, the block shares owned
by the parent company are scarcely traded.
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Three stocks experienced higher volatility
when price limits were widened, Notably,
stock return volatility actually decreased for
one stock when price limits were widened.
These results suggests that even for
markets dominated by unsophisticated retail
investors, wider price limits do not worsen
volatility. I suspect that widening price limits
is not causing an increase in volatility due to
improvements in market efficiency. With
respect to the claim that narrow price limits
introduce inefficiencies, this study shows
that stocks that exhibit serial correlation
when price limits are more restrictive. This is
consistent with the arguments in Fama
(1988) and Lehmann (1989).

Even with a more appropriate specification
and market conditions, there are still other
issues not explicitly modeled here that may
be useful in enriching the robustness of
these results. It must be noted that this study
does not examine whether the results will be
consistent if the initial level of the price limits
are different. Also, the study may not be
generalizable to other markets if insider
trading or other frictional issues are
prevalent. It may also be beneficial to control
the impact of some macroeconomic
variables such as inflation, FDI, growth
rates, commodity prices, etc. on volatility to
ensure robustness of the results.These
results have important practical implications
for emerging countries. Small markets can
widen/expand price limits because they do
not increase volatility but rather improve
efficiency. A more efficient market may
attract foreign and institutional investors who
may help reduce the cost of capital or even
spur economic growth.

I also note some negative correlation
between stock liquidity and conditional
volatility after price limits are widened.
Stocks with lower free-floats/turnover-ratios
tend to exhibit higher volatility when price
limits are widened. Additionally, I find that the
stocks with large foreign ownership also
experience higher volatility when price limits
are expanded.

5.0 Conclusion
This study evaluates whether widening price
limits from (+/-) 5% to (+/-) 10% in the
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) caused
volatility to increase. It has been argued by
Kim & Rhee (1997) and more recently by
Farag (2013) that removing price limits does
not cause volatility to worsen. Others like
Westerhoff (2003) and Huang et al. (2001)
counter by arguing that price limits do
moderate volatility if markets are inefficient. I
extend the conversation by empirically
assessing the overreaction and information
hypotheses by using a more appropriate
market (NSE) and a more robust
methodology- the Stochastic Volatility
model. The study finds that widening price
limits does not cause volatility to increase in
the NSE. Widening price limits improves the
efficiency of the NSE which explains why
volatility does not worsen. I also find a strong
connection between level of foreign
ownership of a stock and an increase in
conditional volatility when price limits are
widened. These results are robust to other
empirical specifications.

The study uses the NSE as a case study to
investigate the efficacy of price limits
because it exhibits the very characteristics
regulators cite as the reason for instituting
price limits. More than any market of its size,
the NSE is characterized by very low
liquidity, the absence of derivatives, and low
capitalization.
4.2 Implications and Limitations
The results of this paper have direct
implications for other small markets having
similar characteristics with NSE. Widening
price limits may increase efficiency without
increasing volatility making these markets
attractive to foreign portfolio investors.
Additionally, expanding price limits can
mitigate the Magnet Effect commonly
observed in emerging markets with price
limits.

5

At 8.2 percent, the stocks traded turnover ratio of domestic shares is much lower
in the NSE than almost all peer countries. The median turnover as a percentage of
GDP for emerging countries like Nigeria is around 18.2 (World Bank 2015).
The lack of derivative securities on the NSE makes it unique for examining the
impact of price limits. According to Pericli and Koutmos (1997), derivative securities
are an important tool in the price discovery process and also useful
in minimizing stock volatility.
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Table 1: Summary of Market Return Characteristics
Mean

Std. Dev

C.V

Skewness

Ex. Kurtosis

NSE
SSE
DOW

0.00047
0.01079
22.689
-0.1792
0.00007
0.0118
174.96
-0.2222
0.00045
0.00917
20.09
-0.3483
NOTES- NOTES- Std. Dev stands for standard deviation; C.V is the coefficient of variation

13.81
2.08
3.98

Table 2: Select Financial Features of Chosen Stocks
Market
Cap
($,millions)

Daily
Average
Turnover
(%)

Shares
Out
(billions)

Free
Float
(%)

Dividend
Yield
(%)

Foreign
Ownership
(%)

BAGCO**
DIAMOND
DNMEYER*
FCMB
FIDELITY
FIDSON
GTB

104.5
205.1
3.3
213.8
217.3
23.3
3500

6.2
23.2
0.4
19.8
28.9
1.5
30

0.002
0.045
0.004
0.017
0.025
0.079
0.042

99
69
67
98
96
93
93

4.12
5.03
N/A
10.2
10.61
2.73
6.42

N/A
14.79
N/A
5.31
0.14
0.18
11.91

INTERBREW
NB
PRESCO
PZ
REDSTAR
STERLING
UACN
WAPCO
ZENITH

271.5
4870
152.5
495.1
12.6
320.6
305.2
2172
2775

3.2
7.9
1.1
3.9
0.6
28.9
1.9
4.7
31

0.013
0.031
0.004
0.008
0.011
0.005
0.015
0.043
0.109

82
32
40
31
77
62
51
91
93

1.52
3.14
2.81
2.92
7.45
2.54
4.9
3.35
1.24

65
67
60
63.89
0.79
11.81
7.8
60.07
15.44

NOTES- Market data is from closing prices on September 18, 2012 from the Financial Times. * Trading in DNMEYER was suspended in 2013 due to pending litigation
** BAGCO was delisted from the main board of the NSE because the company was bought over by another firm on the exchange. Due to inadequate observation
points for BAGCO and DNMEYER, I did not include them in the analysis.

Table 3: Return Summary Statistics for the Selected Stocks

DIAMOND

0.000339

Std Dev
of
Return
0.0264

FCMB

- 0.000421

0.0244

1.15

FIDELITY

0.000337

0.0256

0.19

FIDSON

0.000288

0.0337

0.42

GTB

0.000943

0.0191

1.78

INTERBREW

0.001458

0.0268

3.05

NB

0.00092

0.0176

2.67

PRESCO

0.001663

0.0267

2.99

PZ

0.00028

0.0232

4.42

REDSTAR

0.000483

0.0308

0.88

STERLING

0.000172

0.0307

0.16

UACN

0.000557

0.0201

4.56

WAPCO

0.001209

0.0193

4.56

ZENITH

0.000684

0.0203

2.04

Mean
Return

Ex.
Kurtosis
2.07

BoxPierce
Test
24.63
(0.000)
7.82
(0.020)
1.16
(0.561)
15.19
(0.000)
2.09
(0.352)
11.36
(0.003)
8.67
(0.013)
4.09
(0.195)
3.49
(0.174)
16.21
(0.000)
6.84
(0.032)
8.22
(0.016)
1.42
(0.493)
7.97
(0.018)

JarqueBera
Statistic
73.16
(0.000)
47.17
(0.000)
49.27
(0.000)
8.00
(0.018)
165.95
(0.000)
393.9
(0.000)
273.24
(0.000)
404.78
(0.000)
841.21
(0.000)
34.45
(0.000)
3.93
(0.140)
922.78
(0.000)
919.36
(0.000)
112.37
(0.000)

NOTES -This table highlights some features of the selected stocks. Std Dev stands for Standard
Deviation. The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
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Table 4: Raw Count of Limit Hits
Narrow Price Limits
Lower
Upper Hits
Hits

Wider Price Limits
Upper
Lower
Hits
Hits

DIAMOND
FCMB
FIDELITY
FIDSON
GTB

18
9
9
7
9

15
11
3
10
3

1
0
0
3
0

2
1
0
2
0

INTERBREW

23

10

8

2

NB
PRESCO
PZ
REDSTAR
STERLING
UACN
WAPCO
ZENITH

13
25
14
13
13
17
17
11

5
11
10
10
13
11
7
3

0
9
4
5
2
2
0
0

0
3
3
1
1
0
1
0

NOTES - Presented in this table are the number of times stocks attain the maximum limit allowed
in a trading session.

Table 5: Serial Correlation of Daily Stock Returns
Lag 1

Lag 2

Narrow
Limits

Wider
Limits

Narrow
Limits

Wider
Limits

0.114

0.042

0.087*

FCMB

0.191
0.111 **

0.054

-0.018

0.007

FIDELITY

0.085**

-0.026

0.06

0.178

0.077
-0.107**

-0.031
-0.012***

0.027

-0.100**

-0.007
-0.023
-0.071

DIAMOND

FIDSON

INTERBREW

0.078
0.156**

NB

0.137**

- 0.065

0.056
-0.110 **

PRESCO

0.092

0.023

-0.076

-0.022

PZ

0.014

0.069
-0.145 **

-0.071
-0.047

0.000
-0.157 ***

0.013

-0.023

0.016

GTB

0.072

STERLING

-0.082
0.142**

UACN

0.109*

0.073

-0.018

-0.027

WAPCO

0.03

0.037

ZENITH

0.004

0.037

-0.057
-0.087**

0.065
-0.076*

REDSTAR

NOTES -*** shows significance at 99% level, ** at 95% level and * is at 90% level.
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Table 6: Conditional Volatility of Stock Returns
μ
φ
Mean
Std
Mean
Std
DIAMOND
-7.62
0.17
0.75
0.05

Mean
0.84

Std
0.12

FCMB

-9.36

0.34

0.22

0.04

5.41

0.16

-0.90***
[-1.6 -0.18]

FIDELITY

-7.55

0.16

0.83

0.04

0.54

0.08

-0.05
[-0.14 0.02]

FIDSON

-6.92

0.21

0.95

0.02

0.19

0.05

0
[-0.03 0.02]

GTB

-8.64

0.17

0.65

0

1.08

0.1

0
[-0.15 0.16]

INTERBRW

-15.51

0.53

0.43

0.03

6.77

0.17

0.57
[-0.33 1.40]

NB

-11.73

0.3

0.28

0.04

4.45

0.15

1.54***
[0.89 2.19]

PRESCO

-15.52

0.41

0.23

0.03

7.28

0.17

1.21***
[0.35 2.15]

PZ

-15.41

0.39

0.16

0.03

7.1

0.17

1.24***
[0.46 2.10]

REDSTAR

-11.94

0.4

0.14

0.03

7.39

0.19

-0.65
[-1.61 0.31]

STERLING

-6.91

0.18

0.93

0.04

0.18

0.07

-0.03
[-0.09 0.00]

UACN

-13.51

0.35

0.09

0.03

6.79

0.16

-0.5
[-1.36 0.35]

WAPCO

-13.73

0.36

0.11

0.03

6.63

0.16

0.3
[-0.54 1.14]

ZENITH

-8.4

0.17

0.68

0.07

1

0.14

-0.05
[-0.21 0.10]

σ

δ
Mean
-0.12
[-0.26 0.00]

NOTES- Columns 1 & 2 present the mean posterior density of log volatility μ and its standard deviation respectively.
Columns 3 & 4 display the mean and standard deviation of the persistence of log volatility, φ; Column 5 & 6 presents the
volatility of log volatility, σ, and its standard deviation. Column 7 presents the mean of the dummy variable that captures
the impact of wider price limits, δ. The numbers in parentheses in column 7 gives the 95% credibility interval for δ.
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